This work is motivated by the increase in the number of premium store brands over the past decade, now such store brands may be more expensive per unit volume than national brands. vVith this perspective, in this work we explore advertising and pricing decisions national and premium store brands can make. We develop an analytical game theoretic model using a quadratic advertisement cost function. Using this model we characterize the advertising and pricing decisions each of the brands will make under different market conditions. We find that in some cases only the national brand or the store brand will advertise, both brands will advertise, or no brand will advertise. In the case when pricing and advertising decisions are made in unison, we find that a national brand is better off free riding from the advertising efforts of the store brand. Alternatively when pricing and advertising decisions are made sequentially or separately, we find that either of the two brands may advertise as determined by market conditions. It is such insights that may not be exhibited in practice, that we hope will be considered by brand managers.
Introduction
In this paper we consider a national brand (NB), also referred to as a manufacturer, and a store brand (SB), also referred to as a retailer, within the same marketplace. We characterize the equilibrium advertising strategies of the NB and the SB as a function of market state. In particular, we consider whether the market has spillover demand or not, and whether there is profit sharing amongst the national and store brands. Though they have been around since the 1950s (Pa.t.ti and Fisk, 1982) , the majority of store brands still compete with national brands based on price using some form of promotion or pricing strategy. However, as the market share of private labels increases (Kumar and Stecnkamp, 20() 7), more retailers are introducing premium store (house) brands (Huang and Huddlest.on, 2009 ) that may actually 2 be more expensive than national brands (Karp, 2012) . In these situations the SB, retailer, may actually want to advertise its product, and not let the NB, manufacturer, do all of the advertising. In this paper we first present the general model we consider. We then derive the advertising decisions each brand will make given that prices are fixed a priori, similarly the pricing decisions each brand will make given the advertising decisions are fixed a priory. Finally, we present the advertising and pricing decisions each brand will make if both decisions are made in unison.
We use a Stackelberg model, with the national brand as the first mover in this paper.
As discussed in detail in Section 3, we consider both advertising and pricing decisions made by each of the brands. We assume the NB and SB consider only one product, or a single product category, and not a collection of products/categories as Erdem and Chang (2012) show there may be cross categorical affects for both store and national brand. In solving for the optimal advertising and pricing levels, we find situations where the store brand will want to advertise in conjunction with the national brand. Similarly, there are situations when the store brand will not want to advertise at all and let the national brand do all of the advertising. Surprisingly, we find cases when the national brand will want to let the store brand do all of the advertising. We also find that the characteristics of a premium store brand may depend on which primary method is used for marketing/promoition (advertising or pricing). These results provide managerial insight as to possible reactions by a national brand to a new premium store brand.
In the remainder of the paper we first discuss related work in Section 2. We then, in Section 3, introduce and formally discuss and solve the advertising/pricing models. In Section 4, we present some managerial insights gleaned from our analytical results and conclude the paper.
Related Work
While there is rich literature in studying the dynamics between national and store brands, for a comprehensive and excellent review, see Sethuraman (2009) , that compiles and assesses results from analytical models with empirical evidences and credibility from practice exec utives, most of the attention is paid on the competitive basis since a SB product is often viewed as a clone (copycat or generic) to the NB's. Because of this underlying assumption on the inferiority of SB products, it generally limits the retailer's strategy space to whether to launch SB products or not (Horowib; Haju et aI., 1995) , and if so, how the SB should promote (in price) to undercut the NB and thus gain market share given certain market structure and product characteristics (TvIills, 1999; Raju et a1., 1990 ; Sayman E't aI., 2(02).
On the other hand, from the incumbent manufacturer's (NB's) perspective, the strategic decisions are then often confined to how to deter the SB's entrance (Mills, 1999) , or how to develop effective counter-strategy in order to differentiate the NB from the SB or defend leadership in quality (Choi and Coughlan, 2006; Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998) . With this paper we address not only pricing strategies a SB can employ, but also advertising strategies.
Most studies advocate the NB manufacturers to invest in advertising and developing new products, while discouraging the SB retailers from advertising but rather promoting low prices, as said by Webster (2000) "price is the dominant variable in many store brands' value proposition." Although earlier work glean interesting insights into market equilibriums in terms of the existence of the SB and its price-promoting strategy in response to the NB's actions, these recommendations are mainly based on the assumption of no sustainable strong SBs, usually established through brand advertising. This may have been true traditionally as Brester and Schroeder (1995) show that the estimates of the marginal effectiveness of advertising on generic meats are not significant. However, in recent years, premium SBs have been introduced by many retailers to achieve differentiation from other stores and are positioned on superior quality rather than price, e.g., "Archer Farms" at Target Corp and "Simple Truth" at Kroger Co (Karp, 2012) . Levy and Gendel-Gutennan (2012) provide a conceptual framework to show the importance of creating a strong SB through advertising and innovation. It was found empirically that advertising also has an indirect effect on the SB's perceived quality, a most important factor in influencing customer's purchase intention of the SB.
Despite the recently discovered importance of advertising SB products, we find very little analytical investigation into how the NB should advertise to influence purchase intention, facing the emergence of premium SBs as retailers gear up effort in brand advertising and store loyalty. Birwaclker (2011) proposes that investing in holistic brand development pro grams benefits not only NB manufacturers but also progressive SB retailers to drive higher differentiation and lasting relationship with their shoppers. Zaccour (2005, 2006) propose an analytical model in this area that characterizes the equilibrium advertising decisions made by each brand when a NB partially covers a SB's advertising costs. Fnr thermore BirwacU,er (2011) suggests, to compete for consumers' dollars, joining forces or strategic partnerships between store and national brands may be formed in gaining shopper insights and identifying focused destination categories. Therefore, the effect of advertising can be either category building (also known as informative/complementary) or share stealing (persuasive/competitive) as documented by existing literature (Dub6 and Manchanda, 2005; Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; Vilcassim ct aI., 1999) .
Despite the rich literature in studying the strategic roles of advertising for firms facing competition, only a few papers examine the interaction between advertising and pricing de cision. Vilcassim et al. (1999) propose an oligopoly model to econometrically analyze the dynamic pricing and advertising competition among firms and find empirically that firms compete on advertising but collaborate on pricing. Karray and Martin-HerrAn (2008) study the relationship between the two decisions made sequentially through a game-theoretic model and find that in the case of competitive advertising, the pricing effects depends on the inten sity of the competition and advertising. However, the target of their retailer's advertising is not on the SB product but rather the store itself so such complementary advertising always improves both the NB's and SB's demand; while in this paper, we consider premium store brands so their advertising campaigns may either be complementary or competitive. In a differential game setting, assuming symmetric price sensitivity for both the NB and SB for tractability, Karray and lvIart.in-Hern1.n (2009) study the joint advertising and pricing deci sions facing the two brands and find the retailer's best response to competitive advertising also depends on the intensity of pricing and advertising competition while the manufacturer always concedes on price and advertising under greater competition.
In this paper we employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the NB/SB (man ufacturer /retailer) strategic advertising and pricing interaction, in the spirit of Karney and Martln-HC'rrAn (2008) . Making pricing and product selection decisions has been examined thoroughly in the above-mentioned earlier works, however in this work we examine both pricing and advertising decisions being made in unison or separately. Specifically, comple mentary and competitive advertising is incorporated into the model to evaluate the impact of the collaboration/competition level on the two parties' advertising and pricing decisions.
Attention is given to what advertising and pricing strategy the market leader (the NB man ufacturer) would adopt in anticipation of the response from the follower (the SB retailer) and the extent to which the two collaborate or compete. In addition to characterizing the optimal advertising and pricing decisions by the manufacturer and the retailer, we further consider and derive the conditions for the corner solutions in which only one channel member exerts efforts in advertising, and the conditions under which premium SB may possibly arise.
Model and Analysis
In this section we present the analytical model that determines the NB's and SB's best pricing and advertising strategies. In Section 3.1 we introduce the notation of the model and present the most general formulation. We start with analyzing special cases of the general formulation in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, in which we consider advertising decisions with pricing decisions given, and pricing decisions with advertising decisions given, respectively. Finally, 4 3 in Section 3.4 we solve the general instance with both pricing and advertising decisions made in unison.
Notation and Model Setup
In the model we consider a national brand, NB, and a store brand, SB, each setting their own retail prices, Pi with i E {N, S}, where PN is the retail price of the NB and Ps is the retail price of the SBI. Similarly both brands will set the amount of advertising effort to exert in order to increase market sizes, Ai, i E {N, S}. As supported by the findings in Slldhir (2001) and Che et al. (2007) , we model the manufacturer-retailer relationship using a manufacturer Stackelberg framework. In fact in addition to the two papers above, in a recent literature survey no paper was found to use Nash simultaneous moves (Set.huraman, 2009, page 8) in this setting.
The parameters of the model that are exogenously determined will now be discussed. As the NB is already established there is a pre-existing base market size AN with neither the SB nor NB exerting any additional advertising effort. Without loss of generality, we assume the manufacturing costs of both products to be zero. A fraction (3 E (0,1) of all NB sales will go the SB as profit, and therefore the wholesale price of the NB product is (1 -(3)PN.
Though each brand is setting its own advertising decision, as the two brands are selling substitutable products, ai measures the spillover effect of advertising effort from i E {N, S} to j E {N, S} : j =f i, (as E (0,1) and aN E (-1,1)). For example, aN is the advertising effect from NB to SB. The range of aN, is used to capture both complementary, aN > 0, and competitive, aN < 0, advertising scenarios. We do not consider as negative, as we do not model a national brand advertising directly against a store brand good.
Since pricing has an effect on the demand for goods of each brand, we introduce ai, i E {N, S} as the negative effect of price on the demand for the good sold by i. Similarly, we define b i as the positive effect the competitor's price, j E {S, N} has on demand for the good sold by i E {N, S} : i =f j. For example, aN measures the impact of PN on the demand for NB's product, similarly b N measure the impact of Ps on the demand for NB's product.
Finally, we use c;,i E {N, S}, to denote the marginal cost of advertising for each of the brands. As we will discuss below the advertising cost is assumed to be quadratic in the market size. 1Please see Appendix A for an exhaustive list of the notation used.
Profit Functions
Using the notation introduced above, we formally present the profit functions we use in our model. We use 7ri to denote the profit of brand i E {N, S}. We define 7rN as:
For given values of the decision variables, AN and PN, (1) is the profit function of the NB.
(1 - (3) is the proportion of all NB sales revenue that the NB retains. PN is the per unit price of the NB, and (AN + AN + aN As -aNPN + bNPs) are the number of units sold as a function of the advertising efforts of both brands (AN + aNAs), the base market size AN, and the pricing strategies of both brands bNps -aNPN. Note that we are assuming the cost of advertising is not linear but quadratically increasing in the difference of desired and base market sizes. While the quadratic functional form captures the diminishing marginal returns to advertising as is done in other works (Amrollche et aI., 20D8a,b; Dulle and Manchancla, 2005; KarnLY and IVlmtfn-Herrrin, 2008, 2009; Vilcassim el; aI., 1999) , we further generalize the cost function to take into account that the marginal return rate on advertising may be decreasing in the base market size AN, i.e., advertising may cost more for the manufacturer with high base market size AN to further expand the market. Given the actions of the NB, the profit function for the SB can be written as:
cs [(As +as(AN +AN))2 -(as (AN +AN))2].
Given the advertising and pricing actions of the NB, the first term of the sum in (2) In the remainder of this section we first consider two special cases of the general setup, first, in Section 3.2, pricing decisions are fixed and only advertising decisions are made and second, in Section 3.3, advertising decisions are fixed and only pricing decisions are made. We characterize equilibrium decisions in both cases and provide some managerial intuition for these results. We conclude this section by presenting the general case in Section 3.4. In the following derivations we omit some steps which we include for completeness in Appendix B.
Advertising Only Case
In this section we first consider the special case where the NB and SB prices are pre determined before making advertising decisions. As we model the advertising decisions of the national and store brands under a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, using back ward induction, it is straightforward to show the SB's best response function, AS(AN), for a given AN value is as written in (3). Since (2) is concave in As, its first order condition (FOC) leads to the store brand's reaction function AS(AN):
From (3), we note that As is decreasing in as because the SB benefits from free-riding off of the advertising spillover from the NB, while As is increasing in aN due to the share of the increasing revenue from selling NB products. Substituting AS(AN) into (1) gives a concave function, so the FOC determine the NB's optimal and equilibrium advertising decisions.
( where fiN = (1_{3)(2t.~"N"s)AN and rP = (1-;J)as(l -aNas)~ -/JaN' The above four cases correspond to one interior optimal solution (AN> 0 and As > 0), two corner solutions (AN> 0 and As = 0); (AN = 0 and As > 0), and one degenerate solution (AN = As = 0).
From the conditions for each case, it can be concluded that: first, for the NB to launch any advertising campaign, the price of the NB product must exceed some threshold, fiN, which is increasing (in weak sense, i.e., non-decreasing) in all parameters eN, AN, ;J, aN, and as when the SB's advertising is complementary, i.e., the spillover effect with aN > O. Therefore, the NB will not advertise if any combination of the following scenarios holds: high advertising cost, large base market, high fraction of profit going to the retailer, or high spillover rates.
For the spillover rates, while the free-riding effect of ow is intuitive, it does not seem obvious that high NB-to-SB spillover rate as also discourages the NB from advertisement. This is the case because high as reduces the SB's advertising effort, which means less spillover from the SB advertisement toward the NB product. On the other hand, when the SB's advertising is competitive, aN < 0, the price threshold fiN is lower, implying the NB would start advertising and invest more in advertisement as competition becomes more intense.
Second and independently, for the retailer to invest in advertising the SB product, the price ratio PS/PN must be high enough, greater than the threshold ¢, which is increasing in CS/CN and as (assuming aNaS ~ 0.5) while decreasing in (3 and aN with complementary SB advertising. If advertising is one of the key indicators of a premium SB, then a premium SB should possess any combination of the following characteristics: low costs of advertising ratio CS/CN (ease of advertising in comparison with the NB), low NB advertising spillover (unique NB features), high fraction of the NB sales revenue to the retailer (mature NB product so the retailer has more bargaining power over the NB), and high SB advertising spillover (high substitutability of SB to NB). When the SB advertising becomes competitive, AN increases to stay competitive, while As decreases to free-ride from the gain of a higher AN as otherwise a SB would reduce its revenue from selling fewer NB goods.
The non-trivial solutions of As, (5), provide a different aspect in explaining the SB's advertising strategy: the first term PsiCs corresponds to the effort for its own SB product while the second term (3aNPN / Cs corresponds to the effect of NB sales due to the share (3 of all NB revenue and advertising spillover aN. When both SB and NB advertise, the advertising effort is adjusted down by spilled efforts from the NB's advertisement as(l (3)(1 -aNas)PN/CN, and when only the SB advertises the benefit is adjusted by the base market size.
Pricing Only Case
In this section we consider the case in which for given advertising expenditures of the NB and SB, each may only maximize their expected profit by setting their pricing strategies, PN and Ps respectively. Carrying out backward induction we can show that (2) is concave in
Ps for a given PN and fixed advertising strategies. Determining the optimal SB price for a given PN leads to:
as It can be readily seen from (6) 
The form of P'N in (7) shows that it is increasing in both advertising efforts: the first part of the numerator (AN + AN + O<NAs) is the direct effect from self, NB, advertising and SB spillover efforts, while the second part /J:s [As + o<s(AN + AN)] reflects the indirect effect from the SB pricing strategy influenced by the SB advertising and NB advertising spillover.
In the denominator, the sensitivity of NB demand to NB price is dampened from aN to aN -/J:s(b s + f3b N ) due to the competing price of the SB, Ps, in (5) that is also increasing PN. We may find P'S by substituting (7) into (6), which we omit in this exposition. Note that to ensure the concavity of the NB's profit function, (7) is only valid in the case that:
Inequality (8) (8) is violated meaning the profit function becomes convexly increasing), it is then to the NB's advantage to set P'N as high as possible to gain infinite profit, which is not a well-defined scenario. Due to this seemingly degenerate scenario, we do not consider it in detail in this paper.
As pricing is a focal point of this subsection, we glean further insights by investigating the relative magnitude of the two prices, P'N and P'S. To have P'N > P'S as most commonly seen, the following relationship must hold:
The left hand side of (9) is the advertising effort ratio measuring the NB's effort with respect to the SB's with the adjustment (bN/2aS) due to price competition. The right hand side measures the NB's demand sensitivity in price with respect to the SB's. The conditions in which this inequality is violated so that P'N ~ P'S characterize a premium SB. From (9) we determine that a premium store brand will exists, for a set of fixed advertising decisions in the complementary advertising setting, if: the spillover rate is high from NB to SB (as) and a powerful retailer (fJ), maybe due to a mature NB product, and the spillover rate is low from SB to NB (aN), perhaps due to some unique properties of the SB product.
As we allow for competitive advertising, i.e., aN < 0, we observe that in this case there is a theoretical possibility for PN to be negative or zero. However, for this to occur, AN + AN < laNIAs, which means the SB must put forth so much advertising effort that it advertises more than the NB and the base market size and effectively advertises the NB out of existence. Though theoretically feasible, we know of no such SB that has so much market power that it can ever impact the NB price to such a great extent.
General Case
This section considers the general case in which each brand determines its optimal advertising and pricing decisions in tandem. We assume that the NB sets its pricing and advertising decisions before the SB. Through backward induction, we find the best response functions of the SB, i.e.,
As(AN, PN) and pS(AN' PN).
We will then substitute the best response functions of the SB into the NB's profit function to determine the NB's optimal adverting and pricing levels, i.e., AN and PN'
We first start with the SB's best response functions by considering its FOCs with respect to As and Ps to find As(AN,PN) and pS(AN,PN): 
{ o otherwIse.
To ensure optimality of (10) and (11) the second order optimality conditions (SOCs) must be satisfied, i.e., the Hessian of (2) must be negative semidefinite, equivalently 4ascs > 1 must hold.
Substituting the SB's best response functions (10) and (11) into (1), and we find the Hessian of the NB's profit function as
].
To ensure that (12) is negative semidefinite, and that the PN and AN we find using FOCs are maximums, the following condition must hold as a lower bound on eN:
To have a valid bound, the denominator of the RHS (right hand side) must be positive, i.e., We conclude this section by discussion the implications of our results. From (10) and (11) we note that A* .. 
Insight and Conclusion
This work adds to the literature on advertising and pricing interplay that exists between a national brand and a store brand good. With the strong rise in store brand market share and the propensity of stores to launch premium store brands, we believe the managerial insights for both a retailer, store brand, and a manufacturer, national brand, will be of great interest. Table 1 summarizes the main contributions of this article using a stylized model. When only advertising decisions are considered, we found that premium store brands strive for a low NB spillover rate and a high SB spillover rate (or low competitive effect from SB adver tising); while when only considering pricing decisions, however, we found that the opposite conditions are preferred, i.e., high NB and low SB spillover (high with SB competition) rates encourage premium store brands. It is important to note that whether the SB advertising is competitive or complementary has a deciding effect on how the retailer's bargaining power over the wholesale price would influence the advertising and pricing strategies. Hence the characterization of a premium store brand depends on which marketing/promotion instru ment (advertising or pricing) is the primary method for driving the demand. In the case when both methods are simultaneously utilized, the national brand manufacturer always exerts no advertising effort and free-rides the retailer. However, it may not be the case that both pricing and advertising decisions are made simultaneously, but rather a repeated/sequential process is used to determine the final equilibrium decisions. In the future, using retail data, it will be interesting to develop empirical methods to identify favorable market conditions for a premium store brand. In addition to this empirical question, some analytical questions remain unanswered. In particular, this article assumes that the advertising cost function is quadratic. This is a fine analytical assumption with diminishing return on investment, but in practice there might exist some other function governing the cost-demand relationship, such as an "S-shaped" function. Using historical retail data, we would like to derive particular functional forms for the cost-demand function and derive the optimal decisions and compare them to what occurs in practice. Finally, we would also like to extend our model to take into account the case in which a national and a store brand make decisions simultaneously, i.e., there is no leader-follower dominance.
As one can see, there are quite a few open areas of research in this field. However, we think that this work is a necessary step to help retailers make more informed store brand decisions and national brand manufacturers be better prepared to respond to the introduction of additional store brands.
As: the market size of the SB, also referred to as the advertising effort exerted by the SB 
Cs
In (17) As is an interior point solution, including non-negativity constraint on As we have: 
B.3 General Case
Ps + (3PND!N -2cs(As + D!S(AN + AN)) -0 (As + D!S(AN + AN) -2asPs + bSPN) + (3P N b N -0 Ps -2cs(As + D!S(AN + AN)) -(3PND!N As --(3P N b N -D!S(AN + AN) + 2as . (2cs(As + D!S(AN + AN)) -(3PND!N) -(3PND!N -bSPN As(l -4ascs) --(3PNbN -D!S(AN + AN) + 4ascs(D!s(AN + AN)) -2aS(3PND!N -(3PND!N -bSPN (-b s -(3b N -2(3aSD!N)PN + D!s(4ascs -l)(AN + AN) bs+!3bN+2!3aS<>Np _ D! (A + A ) if bs +!3 b N+2!3 a S<>N > A + A _ 4ascs-1 N S N -.l'!.. <>s(4ascs 1) p N N-.l'!.. { o otherwise. 4ascs -1 { /3"N+2bscs+2/3bNCS P if bs+/3bN+2/3as"N P > A + A 4ascs-l N frs(4ascs-l) N N---1i o otherwise.
C Sensitivity Analysis on (3
The optimal decisions, pricing and advertising, determined in Section 3 may depend on the wholesale price that we model using an exogenously set parameter (3. In this section we examine how these decisions change with (3.
From Section 3.2 we know that when Ps and PN are fixed, the optimal advertising deci sions are:
( (30) and (31) we note that the NB will decrease their advertising ef fort with (3, Le., lower wholesale price will lead to lower advertising effort. Conversely, as wholesale price decreases, (3 increases, the SB will exert larger effort in the case advertising campaigns are complementary, aN is positive. However, in the case advertising campaigns are competitive, the effect of (3 on the SB advertising decision may depend on the relative magnitude between aN and as among other parameters, Le., whether the direct competing effect a N l!.!:L is stronger than indirect spillover effect as (l-a (8), and thus Ps is also increasing in fJ.
We finally consider the general case: 
otherwise.
TaJdng the partial derivatives of the equilibrium decisions with respect to fJ we have: otherwise.
From (34) we note that PN is decreasing in {3 for the general hand. Things are not so obvious for the SB, As and Ps may increase or decrease with {3 depending on the relationships between the terms. If the first term of each of the partials is greater than the second then, the optimal decisions decrease with {3, otherwise they both increase with {3.
